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Summary 
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cultural diaspora to interact across different cities. In so doing, we propose a simple two- 
city model with two mobile cultural groups. A localized externality fosters the productivity 
of individuals when groups interact in a city. At the same time, such interaction dilutes 
cultural identities and reduces the consumption of culture-specific goods and services. We 
show that the two groups segregate in different cities when diaspora members find it hard 
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communication is easy. The model generates situations in which segregation is an 
equilibrium but is Pareto dominated by integration. 
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Abstract
We study how the city system is a⁄ected by the possibility for the members of the same
cultural diaspora to interact across di⁄erent cities. In so doing, we propose a simple two-
city model with two mobile cultural groups. A localized esternality fosters the productivity
of individuals when groups interact in a city. At the same time, such interaction dilutes
cultural identities and reduces the consumption of culture-speci￿c goods and services. We
show that the two groups segregate in di⁄erent cities when diaspora members ￿nd it hard to
communicate at distance whereas they integrate in multicultural cities when communication
is easy. The model generates situations in which segregation is an equilibrium but is Pareto
dominated by integration.
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11 Introduction
Recent decades have seen the intensi￿cation of cultural diasporas. People have always moved
across countries and large cities have often hosted multicultural crowds. Historically, however,
cultural identity and territory have mostly tended to coincide. This is increasingly changing.
Due to rapid improvements in communication and transportation technologies it is now possible
for people belonging to the same culture to maintain close interactions even when geographically
separated. Individuals are thus able to maintain their cultural identities wherever they move to,
so they can be ￿both here and there￿(Beck, 2000). Indeed, many contemporary immigrants are
what anthropologists call transmigrants, that is, people ￿rmly rooted in their new country who
still maintain multiple linkages to their homeland (Glick Schiller et al., 1995).1
Our aim is to study how the city system is a⁄ected by the possibility of members of the same
cultural diaspora to interact across di⁄erent cities. In particular, we want to investigate how
such possibility a⁄ects the size and cultural composition of cities as well as the productivity and
consumption patterns of their residents.
In so doing, we propose a simple model with two mobile cultural groups and two open cities
whose size is penalized by congestion costs. In the model what works in favor of the coexistence
of di⁄erent cultures within the same city is a localized esternality that fosters the productivity
of individuals when these interact with other individuals belonging to a di⁄erent culture. The
underlying idea is that individuals with di⁄erent cultures have complementary ways of addressing
the same problem. It is as if they had access to di⁄erent pieces of the same puzzle. Because
they possess complementary pieces of information, pooling them generates better outcomes.
What works against coexistence is, instead, the dilution of cultural identities that reduces the
consumption of culture-speci￿c goods and services. We model the defense of cultural identity
as a costly activity involving both parental e⁄ort and peer e⁄ects. Quite naturally, costs are
particularly high for minorities, which make individuals prefer to reside in cities where their
culture is majoritarian. This desire is weakened when individuals can keep strong links with
their own folks no matter where they reside.
The model predicts that improvements in communication foster the emergence of multicul-
tural cities as people become able to enjoy the associated productivity gains without su⁄ering
from cultural dilution. In the focal case of equally sized cultural groups, for high level of com-
munication barriers, the unique equilibrium outcome is characterized by the segregation of the
two cultural groups in two cities of the same size. At the other extreme, for low communication
barriers the unique equilibrium outcome implies the integration of cultural groups in two cities
sharing not only the same size but also the same degree of cultural diversity.
For intermediate communication costs, both segregation and integration are equilibria of the
model. This implies ￿ hysteresis￿in the cultural composition of cities: only large enough migration
1This phenomenon has been linked to the fact that global modes of production necessitate transnational
practices (Basch et al., 1994).
2shocks can drive the equilibrium from segregation to integration and viceversa.2 For high con-
gestion costs, additional equilibria also exist in which the two cities have di⁄erent sizes. While
the large city hosts both cultural groups, the small city hosts one group only. In this outcome,
the large city has higher congestion costs but pays higher wages due to higher producivity. At
the same time, it o⁄ers a lower level of cultural consumption as cultural identities are more di-
luted. Hence, the model is able to generate a city system in which a large multicultural primary
city exhibiting higher productivity coexists with a small culturally homogeneous secondary city
where lower productivity is compensated buy stronger cultural identity. This seems to capture
a salient feature of the urban system in several countries. It also generates a positive correlation
between cultural diversity and productivity that, as discussed below, is indeed found in the data.
Additional results concern the extent to which preferences value standard consumption rela-
tive to cultural consumption (￿ materialism￿ ) and cultural transmission relies on parental e⁄ort.
Materialism and parental transmission both favor multicultural cities by giving little weight to
cultural consumption and peer e⁄ects respectively. From a welfare point of view, the model
generates situations in which segregation of di⁄erent cultural groups in di⁄erent cities is an equi-
librium but is Pareto dominated by integration. In these situations market signals do not assign
enough weight to the positive impact of intercultural interactions on productivity. This is the
case for intermediate communication barriers.
Our modeling choices build on two main lines of research. The ￿rst consists of studies on the
relation between cultural diversity and economic performance. At the urban level, productivity
gains from cultural diversity have been measured by Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006) in US
cities as well as by Bellini, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Prarolo (2008) in EU NUTS3 regions.3 These
gains have been identi￿ed by crossing the information contained in the spatial pattern of wages
and rents. The fact that both these variables are positively correlated with various measures of
cultural diversity reveals a positive correlation between diversity and total factor productivity.4
Instrumental variable analysis then highlights a casual link from the former to the latter. These
￿ndings are consistent with work by Lazear (1999). His idea is that a global ￿rm is a multi-
cultural team whose existence is somewhat puzzling. Combining workers who have di⁄erent
cultures, legal systems, and languages imposes costs on the ￿rm that would not be present were
all workers to conform to one standard. In order to o⁄set the costs of cross-cultural dealing, there
must be complementarities between the workers that are su¢ ciently important to overcome the
costs. Disjoint and relevant skills create an environment where the gains from complementarities
can be signi￿cant.5 This is con￿rmed by several experimental results such as those reported by
2The role played by communication barriers in determining the spatial equilibrium is reminiscent of some
results of the so-called ￿ new economic geography￿(see, e.g., Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004). Indeed, with respect to
the location of each cultural group, the productivity externality acts as a ￿ dispersion force￿whereas the peer e⁄ect
acts as an ￿ agglomeration force￿with communication barriers regulating the balance between the two forces.
3See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey on the relation between ethnic diversity and economic perfor-
mance at country, city and community levels.
4Our model predicts such positive correlation if we interpret congestion costs in terms of congestion in land
use.
5See Berliant and Fujita (2006, 2007) for models of team formation in which a mix of common and individual
3De Drew and West (2001) and Cooper and Kagel (2005).
The second line of research we build on consists of recent studies on the dynamics of edu-
cation and cultural transmission. In Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) and Bisin et al. (2006) the
cultural environment shapes preferences, due to the substitutability between parental pressure
and peer e⁄ects in transmitting certain cultural traits from one generation to the next. Peer
pressure in the form of neighborhood e⁄ects features in Benabou (1993) who models the links
between residential choices, education, and productivity in a city consisting of several commu-
nities. Local complementarities in human capital investment induce occupational segregation,
although e¢ ciency may require identical communities. De Bartolome (1990) obtains the mirror
result in terms of e¢ ciency in a community model with public expenditures set by voting. Here
the tension is between the tendency to segregate due to di⁄erent tastes for public inputs and the
tendency to integrate due to di⁄erent tastes for peer groups. In the decentralized equilibrium
communities may become heterogeneous in composition and ine¢ cient when the peer group ef-
fect is neither ￿too strong￿nor ￿too weak￿ .
The remainder of the paper is organized in ￿ve additional sections. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 characterizes its equilibrium properties in the case of equally sized cultural
groups. Section 4 studies some welfare implications. Section 5 discussed the case of cultural
groups of di⁄erent sizes. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We model a spatial economy consisting of a system of two open cities, A and B, and two types of
individuals belonging to two di⁄erent cultural groups, 1 and 2. Each individual is endowed with
one unit of labor. We call L1 and L2 the exogenouly given measures (￿ numbers￿ ) of individuals
of the two types. All individuals are mobile between the two cities and their residential choices
will be endogenously determined. We index cities by j 2 fA;Bg and types by k 2 f1;2g.
Accordingly, we call Ljk the endogenous number of individuals of type k residing in city j such
that LAk + LBk = Lk. When needed, we will refer to the endogenous population of city j by
Lj = Lj1 + Lj2.
2.1 Preferences
Each individual (￿ parent￿ ) is endowed with one unit of time that she divides between working
and putting e⁄ort in passing her type (￿ cultural trait￿ ) to her child. Her utility comes from the
consumption of a standard good and a cultural good whose fruition is possible as long as the
child shares some of the cultural trait with the parent. The utility of an individual of type k in
types of knowledge determines knowledge creation.
4city j is assumed to take the following Cobb-Douglas functional form
Ujk = ￿ logyjk + (1 ￿ ￿)logcjk (1)
where yjk and cjk are the consumption levels of the standard and cultural goods respectively.
The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) measures the degree of ￿ materialism￿in preferences: the larger ￿, the
more the parent prefers the consumption of the standard good to sharing her culture with her
child.6
Following Bisin et al (2006), the cultural a¢ nity between parent and child depends positively
on the time ejk the parent devotes to cultural transmission (￿ parental education￿ ) as well as
on the child￿ s interactions with other individuals of the same type as the parent (￿ peer e⁄ect￿ ).
These interactions can be both local with residents of the same city j or global with residents
in the other city i. Their intensity depends on the shares of individuals of type k in the two
cities ljk = Ljk=Lj and lik = Lik=Li. It also depends on distance with global interactions being
weaker than local ones. These ideas can be captured by assuming that the peer e⁄ect fjk has
the simple functional form fjk = ljk + ￿lik where ￿ 2 [0;1) is the discount factor applied to
global interactions. An intuitive way to interpret this assumption is that, walking around his
home city, the child has a probability ljk of meeting someone of his parent￿ s type (apart from his
parent). He has also a probability ￿ of getting into contact with someone from the other city,
who in turn has a probability lik of belonging the child￿ s parental type. Parental e⁄ort ejk and
peer e⁄ect fjk then determine the a¢ nity between parent and child, which in turn determines
the consumption level of the cultural good cjk. For concreteness, we assume that
cjk = e￿
jk (ljk + ￿lik)
1￿￿ (2)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the relative importance of parental education for cultural transmission
with respect to the peer e⁄ect.
Labor supply and, therefore, individual income are a⁄ected by two factors. First, time spent in
parental education ejk is subtracted from working time. Second, living in city j entails congestion
costs that are positively related to its population Lj. We de￿ne these costs as a friction that
leaves only a fraction ￿(Lj) of time to work and parental education.7 Following Duranton and
Puga (2001), we assume ￿(Lj) = (1 ￿ ￿Lj) for Lj < 1=￿ and ￿(Lj) = 0 otherwise, with the
positive parameter ￿ measuring the intensity of congestion. Hence, both parental education
and congestion have an opportunity cost in terms of forgone salary, which is re￿ ected in the
individual￿ s budget constraint
Pjyjk = wjk￿(Lj)(1 ￿ ejk) (3)
where Pj is the price of the standard good, wjk is the wage per unit time and ￿(Lj)(1 ￿ ejk) is
6Since our model is a static one, we are not interested in the distribution on types among children, but rather
on the time allocation of the parents and the aggregate economic characteristics of the current generation.
7See Fujita (1989) for a discussion of congestion costs arising from commuting.
5working time net of parental e⁄ort and congestion costs.
Maximizing (1) with respect to ejk subject to (2) and (3) gives the amount of time the
individual spends on education:
e￿ =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(4)
This is decreasing in the individual￿ s materialistic orientation and increasing in the relative
importance of parental education for cultural transmission. The fact that e￿ is independent of
type and city of residence is due to the chosen functional forms. This result serves analytical
tractability without changing the nature of the main tradeo⁄ individuals face in their residential
choices as we will discuss in Section 3.
2.2 Technology
The standard good is supplied by a perfectly competitive sector. It is freely traded within and
between cities so that its price is the same everywhere. We choose this good as numer￿ire so that
PA = PB = 1. Labor is the only input and in city j technology is described by the aggregate
production function
Yj = aj1 [￿(Lj)(1 ￿ ej1)Lj1] + aj2 [￿(Lj)(1 ￿ ej2)Lj2] (5)
where each bracketed term measures the working time of the corresponding type of individual
net of parental e⁄ort and congestion costs.
In (5) the two types of individuals are perfectly substitutable but their productivities ajk
are allowed to be di⁄erent. The source of such di⁄erence lies in the cultural composition of
cities in that individuals are assumed to bene￿t from interactions outside their own groups.
Only interactions within the same city enhance productivity so that the occurrence of inter-
cultural interactions depends only on home city composition and their probability di⁄ers between
groups being higher for the minoritian group than for the majoritarian one. Speci￿cally, let a
denote an individual￿ s productivity when exposed to inter-cultural interactions and ￿ 2 (0;1) the
discount factor when not exposed to such interactions.8 In city j an individual of type 1 faces
a probability lj1 of meeting someone of her own group and lj2 of meeting someone of the other
group. Accondingly, the average productivity of an individual of type 1 is aj1 = a(￿lj1 + lj2)
whereas the (average) productivity of an individual of type 2 is aj2 = a(lj1 + ￿lj2). Perfect
competition and our choice of numeraire then imply that the (average) wage of type k in city j
is wjk = ajk so that we can write:
wj1 = a(￿lj1 + lj2) and wj2 = a(lj1 + ￿lj2) (6)
8As pointed out, for example, by Lazear (1999), inter-cultural interactions are fruitful provided that individuals
with di⁄erent cultures are able to communicate with one another. Assuming ￿ 2 (0;1) implicitly assumes that
productivity gains are positive net of any inter-cultural communication cost.
6for j 2 fA;Bg.
3 The equilibrium
Since Lk is exogenously given, the equilibrium can be de￿ned only in terms of LAk knowing that
LBk = Lk￿LAk. In particular, the distribution of individuals (LA1;LA2) is a spatial equilibrium
when no individual of either type may attain a higher utility level by changing city. Given (3),
(1), (2) and (4), the indirect utility of an individual of type k in city j 2 fA;Bg is:
Vjk (LA1;LA2) = ￿ log(wjk￿(Lj)(1 ￿ e￿)) + (1 ￿ ￿)log
￿
(e￿)




Then a spatial equilibrium arises at LAk 2 (0;Lk) when
￿Vk (LA1;LA2) ￿ VAk (LA1;LA2) ￿ VBk (LA1;LA2) = 0 (8)
or at LAk = 0 when ￿Vk (LA1;LA2) ￿ 0, or at LAk = Lk when ￿Vk (LA1;LA2) ￿ 0 for k 2 f1;2g:
In order to study the stability of a spatial equilibrium, we assume a myopic adjustment
process, that is, the driving force in the migration process is individuals￿current utility di⁄erential
between A and B:
:




￿Vk (LA1;LA2) if 0 < LAk < Lk
minf0;￿Vk (LA1;LA2)g if LAk = Lk
maxf0;￿Vk (LA1;LA2)g if LAk = 0
(9)
where t is time. Clearly, a spatial equilibrium implies
:
LAk = 0 for both k = 1 and k = 2. If
￿Vk (LA1;LA2) is positive, some individuals of type k will move from B to A; if it is negative,
some will move in opposite direction.
A spatial equilibrium is stable for (9) if, for any marginal deviation from the equilibrium,
this equation of motion brings the distribution of individuals back to the original one. Formally,
this is the case if and only if the corresponding eigenvalues of the Jacobian associated with the
dynamic system ( :
LA1 = ￿V1 (LA1;LA2)
:
LA2 = ￿V2 (LA1;LA2)
(10)
are negative if real numbers or have negative real parts if complex numbers.
To characterize the existence and stability of thedi⁄erent equilibrium distributions, it is help-
7ful to use (6) and (7) to rewrite (8) as

















































where we recall that LBk = Lk￿LAk and Lj = Lj1+Lj2. The three factors inside the logarithms
on the right hand side of (11) capture the e⁄ects of the distribution of individuals between cities
on, from left to right, di⁄erential productivity, congestion and cultural transmission. The pro-
ductivity e⁄ect attracts individuals of a certain type to the city where they have a higher chance
of interacting with someone of the other type. This fosters the integration of the two types in
the same city. The congestion e⁄ect, then, determines whether the integrated equilibrium entails
the agglomeration of all individuals in a single cosmopolitan metropolis or their cohabitation
in two multicultural cities. The cultural transmission e⁄ect attracts, instead, individuals to the
city where they have a higher chance of interacting with someone of their own type, which pro-
motes the segregation of types in two di⁄erent cities irrespective of the level of congestion costs.
Henceforth, we will focus our attention of the role of ￿ in balancing the productivity and cultural
transmission e⁄ects. This parameter measures the ease of global interactions among individuals
of the same type and, therefore, the strength of the distant component of the peer e⁄ect. Hence,
a larger value of ￿ reduces the importance of segregation for cultural transmission.
From a di⁄erent angle, (11) also gives information about the di⁄erent consumption patterns of
cultural minorities and majorities. While congestion is culture blind, in a city cultural minorities
enjoy a productivity advantage to the detriment of cultural transmission. Viceversa, cultural ma-
jorities have lower productivity but better cultural transmission. The fact that, by (4), parental
e⁄ort is the same for majorities and minorities implies that both allocate the same time to work
so that the former enjoy higher cultural consumption but lower materialistic consumption than
the latter. Clearly, constant parental e⁄ort deprives the model from a further e⁄ect that could
lead minorities to compensate their weaker peer e⁄ect with higher parental e⁄ort. This would
make them allocate less time to work than majorities leading to a convergence in materialistic
and cultural consumption between minoritian and majoritarian types.
3.1 Agglomeration
Intuition is better served by focusing on the analytically simpler case of two equally sized types
such that L1 = L2 = 1. The implications of allowing for types of di⁄erent sizes will then be
discussed in Section 5.
In an agglomerated equilibrium all individuals of both types are happy to be concentrated
in a single cosmopolitan metropolis. Without loss of generality, let us assume that agglom-
8eration takes place in city A. As discussed above, this is a spatial equilibrium provided that
￿V1 (LA1;LA2) and ￿V2 (LA1;LA2) are both non-negative for LA = L1 + L2, LA1 = L1,
LA2 = L2, LB = 0, LB1 = 0, and LB2 = 0. Substituting these values in (11), we get:








which is non-negative as long as
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)
￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿) ￿ ￿C (12)
Condition (12) shows that a cosmopolitan metropolis is an equilibrium when congestion costs
are low (small ￿) and there is a strong preference for materialistic consumption (large ￿). That
is the case also when, relatively to parental e⁄ort, the peer e⁄ect is of little importance (large ￿)
and weak between cities (small ￿). Intuitively, when congestion costs are low, spatial concentra-
tion is little penalized. When materialism is strong, the bene￿cial e⁄ect of multiculturality on
productivity dominates its adverse e⁄ect on cultural transmission. The latter is, however, weak
when the peer e⁄ect does not play an important role and di¢ cult inter-city interactions do not
make it worthwhile to avoid congestion costs by relocating to the empty city.
Computation of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian associated with the dynamic system (10)
shows that, when the equilibrium with a cosmopolitan metropolis exists, it is always unstable
(see the discussion of Figure 1 below).9 The reason is that any small relocation away from
the metropolis involving both types of individuals makes further relocation attractive due to
congestion costs saving.
3.2 Segregation
In a segregated equilibrium all individuals of each type are happy to be separated from the other
type in their own homogeneous city. Without loss of generality, let us assume that types 1 and
2 are concentrated in cities A and B respectively. This is a spatial equilibrium provided that
￿V1 (LA1;LA2) ￿ 0 and ￿V2 (LA1;LA2) ￿ 0 for LA = L1, LA1 = L1, LA2 = 0, LB = L2,
LB1 = 0, and LB2 = L2. Substituting these values in (11) and recalling that L1 = L2 = 1, we
get:
















9The instability of agglomeration is related to the assumption that the standard good is freely traded between
cities. High enough trade barriers may turn agglomeration into a stable equilibrium.
9Hence, two segregated cities of equal size are a stable equilibrium as long as
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿) ￿ ￿S (13)
This result is explained by the fact that an individual leaving the city where her type is concen-
trated faces a trade o⁄ between higher wage and lower consumption of the cultural good. The
former advantage is due to better chances of interacting with individuals of the other type. The
latter advantage is due to lower chances of transmitting her cultural trait. Di¢ cult inter-city
interactions (small ￿), low productivity gain from multiculturality (large ￿), high importance of
the peer e⁄ect (low ￿), little materialism (low ￿) all foster segregation.
3.3 Integration
In a symmetric cosmopolitan equilibrium individuals are happy to live in two identical cities where
both types are equally represented. This is a spatial equilibrium provided that ￿V1 (LA1;LA2) =
￿V2 (LA1;LA2) = 0 for LA = L1=2 + L2=2, LA1 = LB1 = L1=2, and LA2 = LB2 = L2=2.
Substituting these values in (11), it is straightfoward to see that for both types ￿Vk (L1=2;L2=2)
always equals zero. This implies the symmetric multicultural outcome with the two groups evenly
split between cities is always an equilibrium. It may be, however, unstable. To check its stability
we calculate the corresponding eigenvalues of (10) recalling that L1 = L2 = 1. These eigenvalues
turn out to be real and equal to
r1 = ￿4
￿￿
1￿￿ r2 = ￿4
[(1￿￿)(1￿￿)(1+￿)+￿(1￿￿)]￿￿[(1￿￿)(1￿￿)(1+￿)￿￿(1￿￿)]
(1+￿)(1+￿)
While the former eigenvalue is always negative, the latter is negative if and only if
￿ >
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿B (14)
In this case the symmetric multicultural equilibrium is stable. Condition (14) then implies
that the stability of the symmetric multicultural equilibrium is fostered by strong materialism
(large ￿), large productivity gains (small ￿), important parental rather than peer-driven cultural
transmission (large ￿) and easy cultural interactions between cities (large ￿).
Comparing (13) and (14), it can be shown that ￿B < ￿S for any ￿ 2 (0;1) when ￿=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)] >
1, i.e. when peer e⁄ects are relatively unimportant for cultural transmission (large ￿) and
materialistic consumption is relatively important for consumption (large ￿). In this case, for
￿ 2 (￿B;￿S) both segregation and integration are stable spatial equilibria. Viceversa, when
￿=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)] < 1, ￿B > ￿S for any ￿ 2 (0;1) which rules out the coexistence of the
segregated and integrated equilibria. Henceforth, we allow for such coexistence by assuming
￿=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)] > 1.
103.4 Partial integration
The existence and the stability of segregated and integrated equilibria described so far do not
involve congestion costs ￿ because of symmetry. Indeed, in both types of equilibria all cities host
a population of unit size so that there are no di⁄erences in congestion across cities. Unfortunately
analytical solutions useful to investigate the existence and stability of equilibria (LA1;LA2) dif-
ferent from (0;1), (1;0) and (1=2;1=2) are not available. We have, therefore, to rely on numerical
analysis. In particular, we study the full set of equilibria that arise in the three regions identi￿ed
by ￿ < ￿B, ￿B < ￿ < ￿S and ￿ > ￿S when we vary the congestion cost parameter ￿.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 depicts six di⁄erent phase diagrams of the dynamic system (10), where the thin and
thick curves plot ￿V1 (LA1;LA2) = 0 and ￿V2 (LA1;LA2) = 0 respectively. Some parameters￿
values are hold constant across all diagrams: ￿ = 3=5, ￿ = 1=2 and ￿ = 2=3. These imply
￿B = 1=4 and ￿S = 8=27. The remaining parameters ￿ and ￿ are varied across diagrams as
reported in Table 1. Arrows depict the dynamics and circles highlight stable equilibria.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
￿ 0:15 0:27 0:4 0:15 0:27 0:4
￿ 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:08 0:08 0:08
Table 1. Values of ￿ and ￿ used in the numerical example.
All panels report LA1 on the horizontal axis and LA2 on the vertical one. Left panels (a)-(c)
and right panels (d)-(f) correspond to low and high congestion costs respectively. In panels (a)
and (d), communication costs between cities are such that ￿ < ￿B. Since (13) holds but (14)
is violated, in those two panels the integrated equilibrium (LA1;LA2) = (1=2;1=2) is unstable
(￿ saddle￿ ) whereas segregated outcomes at (0;1) or (1;0) are stable equilibria. Moreover, changes
in congestion costs do not qualitatively alter the number and the position of the equilibria. In
panels (c) and (f) communication costs are such that ￿ > ￿S. As condition (14) holds whereas
condition (13) is violated, the integrated equilibrium (1=2;1=2) is stable (￿ stable node￿ ) while
segregation is not an equilibrium. Again, congestion costs do not qualitatively impact on the
number and the position of the equilibria. In panels (b) and (e), we have ￿B < ￿ < ￿S. Because
both conditions (14) and (13) hold simultaneously, both integration and segregation are stable
equilibria. In this case, panel (e) shows that, if congestion costs fall in an intermediate range, four
additional stable equilibria (plus four additional unstable equilibria) arise. In the four additional
stable equilibria two cities of di⁄erent sizes coexist. The small homogeneous city is inhabited
by only one type of individuals. The big city is, instead, cosmopolitan as it hosts not only
the remaining fraction of individuals of that type but also all the individuals of the other type.
Hence, in the case of ￿B < ￿ < ￿S, there is ￿ hysteresis￿in the cultural composition of cities
as only large enough exogenous migration shocks can drive the equilibrium from segregation to
11(partial or complete) integration and viceversa.
To sum up, the di⁄erent panels of Figure 1 can be used to gauge the impact of improvements
in cultural interactions between cities. This is achieved by comparing the phase diagrams from
top to bottom: (a), (b) and (c) on the left; (d), (e) and (f) on the right. The common conclusion
is that better distant communication (larger ￿) supports the emergence of cosmopolitan cities by
allowing individuals to increasingly rely on their enlarged community for cultural transmission.10
4 Pareto optimality
A key issue is whether decentralized location decisions lead to a suboptimal city composition
from a Pareto point of view. To avoid numerical computations, we focus on the speci￿c question
whether segregation can emerge as a stable decentralized equilibrium when it is Pareto dominated
by integration.
Individuals are better o⁄ in the integrated outcome if their indirect utility is higher than in







￿ 1 ￿ ￿O (15)
As (14) and (13), also (15) holds for strong materialism (large ￿), large productivity gains (small
￿), parental rather than peer-driven cultural transmission (large ￿) and easy cultural interaction
between cities (large ￿).
The threshold ￿O can be compared with the other threshold ￿S below which segregation is
an equilibrium to show that ￿O < ￿S for any values of ￿, ￿ and ￿.11 Then, for values of the
distant communication parameter ￿ 2 (￿O;￿S) segregation is an equilibrium whereas a shift to
integration would be welfare enhancing from a Pareto point of view. Hence, market signals do
not assign enough weight to the positive impact of intercultural interactions on productivity.
Note that when productivity gains from intercultural interaction are absent, ￿ = 1 implies
￿B = ￿S = ￿O = 1 so that segregation is the only stable equilibrium con￿guration and Pareto
dominates integration.
These results imply that, if the economy starts from a segregated equilibrium and communica-
tion costs start falling, individuals are too slow in realizing that there are gains from integration.
This may generate both an unwillingness to emigrate to alien places and a resistance to accept
immigration of alien cultural groups driven by non-economic motives. On both grounds policy
intervention should be granted.
10The same would be true when ￿=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)] < 1 implies ￿B > ￿S.
11To see this, use (13) and (15) to show that ￿O < ￿S if and only if ￿ < 21+(1￿￿)(1￿￿)=￿ ￿1. This disequality
is always satis￿ed since (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)=￿ > 0.
125 The role of group size
All results developed so far assume that the groups of the two types of individuals have the
same unit size (L1 = L2 = 1). This assumption has allowed us to derive several insights on how
integration and segregation may endogenously arise from the tension between the productivity
gains from multiculturality and the associated losses in terms of cultural transmission. In several
real world situations, however, cultural groups have di⁄erent sizes and it is therefore important
to assess how di⁄erential group size may a⁄ect our results.
We start with investigating the role of di⁄erent group sizes L1 and L2 on the sustainability
of the segregated equilibrium in which two homogenous cities of unequal size coexist. As al-
ready discussed, sustainability requires each type to be happy to be separated from the other
type. Without loss of generality, we assume again that types 1 and 2 are concentrated in cities
A and B respectively. This is a spatial equilibrium provided that ￿V1 (LA1;LA2) ￿ 0 and
￿V2 (LA1;LA2) ￿ 0 for LA = L1, LA1 = L1, LA2 = 0, LB = L2, LB1 = 0, LB2 = L2. Substitut-
ing these values in (11), we get:









































which shows that, when cultural groups have di⁄erent sizes, segregation is less likely to be a
stable equilibrium as ￿
0
S < ￿S. This is because of the presence of congestion costs that make it
less attractive to live in the city populated by the larger group. An implication is that, starting
with a low ￿ and segregation, as ￿ increases individuals of the larger group are the ￿rst to leave
their homogeneous city due to higher congestion costs.
Turning to integration, (11) implies that (L1=2;L2=2) is always an equilibrium. However,
its stability must be checked numerically, since no simple analytical solutions can be found for
the expressions of the eigenvalues associated to the Jacobian of system (10). To this end, we
have set L1 ￿ L2 = 1 and analyzed how the phase diagrams (a)-(f) in Figure 1 change as
we increase L1 above one. A general pattern that emerges from every phase diagram is that
the integrated equilibrium is never stable for very large L1. In this case, the only equilibrium
con￿guration features a larger cosmopolitan city inhabited by all individuals of type 2 together
with some individuals of type 1 and a smaller city inhabited by the remaining individuals of
type 1. The explanation is that a smaller relative number of type 2 individuals reduces the
13probability that an individual of type 1 meets someone of type 2 in each integrated city. This
weakens the productivity gain from multiculturality for the larger type 1 giving more weight to
cultural transmission through the peer e⁄ect.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a model in which multicultural cities emerge as the result of cultural diaspo-
ras when diversity fosters productivity and endangers cultural identity. This danger is weakened
when individuals are able to keep strong links with people of their own culture wherever they
reside. Against this background, improvements in communication foster the emergence of mul-
ticultural cities in which diversity promotes productivity. Additional results concern the extent
to which cultural indentity is ￿ materialistic￿or relies on community rather than parental trans-
mission. Materialism and parental rather than peer-driven cultural transmission both favor the
emergence of multicultural cities.
From a welfare point of view, segregation of di⁄erent cultural groups in di⁄erent cities is
an equilibrium but is Pareto dominated by their integration in multicultural cities when the
relative importance of peer e⁄ects for cultural transmission is small, the relative importance of
materialistic consumption is large and the communication within cultures is neither too easy nor
too di¢ cult. In this case, market signals fail to assign the right weight to the positive impact of
intercultural interactions on knowledge creation.
A crucial assumption behind these results is that the externality through which diversity
fosters productivity is more localized than the peer e⁄ect through which cultural homogeneity
fosters cultural transmission. In the opposite scenario, cultural integration would be an equi-
librium of the model for high communication barriers whereas cultural segregation would be an
equilibrium for low communication barriers. The reason is that better communication would
allow di⁄erent cultural groups to enjoy the productive externality without facing the cultural
dilution associated with cohabitation. While we have not dwelt on this scenario as it is symmet-
ric to the one discussed in the paper, whether productive externalities are more localized than
cultural links is clearly an open empirical issues. However, given that the existing evidence does
show that technological spillovers appears to fade away quite rapidly with distance (see, e.g.,
Ja⁄e et al, 1993; Ja⁄e and Trajtenberg, 2002), we think it is fair to consider ours as the natural
default assumption.
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